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SECTION 1: PROPOSAL AND AMENDMENT. 

"The photo then becomes a bizarre medium, a new form of 
hallucination, false on the level of perception, true on the 
level of time." 
Barthes, Camera Lucida.  
My work anchors itself in the specificity of the 
photographic record. Although it is an accepted fact that 
photographs lie, at the same time it can be argued that they 
do contain an element of truth - a knowledge that at some 
time an event occurred and was recorded. It is this 
inherent photographic quality, this dichotomy between 
representation and construction, reality and imagination 
that I intend to investigate and use to pose questions about 
our own notions of reality, of the world we exist in and of 
who or what we are. 
To date all my concerns have involved a progression towards 
this point. My first major piece (Queenstown), deliberately 
mis-used time and place. The latest work (Untitled 1983), 
used an almost filmic technique - a series of frozen 
photographic moments to allow the viewer space to enter. 
This desire to manipulate the photographic moment along with 
the concerns of alienation and vulnerability, of barriers 
and the need to break them, form the basis for my current 
motivation. 
My recent work comes from both observed experience and from 
a strong personal feeling of self investigation, growth and
struggle. The work is intended to explore the state of flux 
in human existence - to reveal both the outer precariousness 
and vulnerability and the inner conflicting desires and 
fears that form and shape a personality. Munch has been a 
source here in the way that, for me, his figures seem about 
to shatter and dissolve into a landscape which itself seems 
ready to dissolve. 
The technical resolution of these ideas will take some time. 
In using photographed figures in an obviously constructed 
and shattered way I intend these and the installation as a 
whole to stand as a metaphor for the various tensions and 
forces that are at work. At present I am experimenting with 
altering and rephotographing human figures out of smaller 
multiple images to form expanded, fragmented but 
recognizable forms. These figures will be worked into the 
larger context of an installation format, itself a 
construction, and I will need to experiment with the use of 
space, juxtaposition of images and the various relationships 
and tensions that can be created and used. 
At first glance it might appear easier to use some other 
medium for this construction. However it is important that 
the work has a direct anchoring in reality, so that it 
becomes, in effect, not a total fantasy created solely from 
imagination but involves a play between real and unreal, 
fiction and fact. It is this bizarre, unresolved tension in 
the photograph which holds and will continue to hold such a 
strong fascination for me. 
16th March, 1987. 
To the Higher Degrees Committee. 
WORK PROPOSAL: RUTH FROST 
The Higher Degrees Committee are asked to note that, while 
my work proposal has provided the basis of my current 
practice, in its outline of concerns and aims, the physical 
transformation of these is now unlikely to appear as an 
installation. The figures with 'the various relationships 
and tensions' are being resolved within a series of large 
composite wall pieces. 
Ruth Frost. 
SECTION II: THEORETICAL SUBMISSIONS. 

SEMINAR PAPER 1. 
This paper was first suggested to me under the title "The 
Politics of Representation". I have held loosely to this, but it is 
more a look at the various critiques, theories and ideas expressed about 
photographs and photographic practice. My reason for doing so is to 
arrive at a better understanding of what it means to photograph and, in 
the light of recent theories, to find where it is that my practice 
stands. I have juxtaposed two books, using Camera Lucida by Roland 
Barthes as a guideline, and introducing arguments from Thinking 
Photography (edited by Victor Burgin) when relevant. Barthes deals with 
the photograph from a personal, subjective viewpoint. The essayists in 
Thinking Photography deal with photography "as a social phenomenon, as a 
producer of meaning. They challenge the concept of the autonomous, 
spontaneously creative artist, the idea of documentary truth in 
photography and the notion of purely visual languages. They develop an 
account of the production of meaning in a photograph within social 
institutions, within a society with a history and within the 
unconscious." (1) 
Barthes' book is divided into two parts. The first is 
relatively simple - in it we first meet his concept of photographic 
death and his division of his interests in a photograph into "studium" 
and "punctum". It is the second part that provides difficulties. We 
find Barthes' definition of the photographic essence to be contrary to 
the theories propounded in Thinking Photography - i.e. that the 
photograph and photographer alike are products of a preconstituted field 
of discourse. I will discuss the concepts of death and violence in 
photography ; take a look at the act of looking itself and finally the 
notion of power based on knowledge as truth. 
Part One 
Barthes writes : 
"By nature the photograph has something tautological 
about it. It is as if the photograph always carries its 
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referent with itself, both affected by the same amorous 
or funeral immobility. At the very heart of the moving 
world they are glued together. The photograph belongs to 
that class of laminated objects whose two leaves cannot 
be separated without destroying them both. Desire and 
its object, dualities we can conceive but not perceive. 
Whatever it grants to vision and whatever its manner a 
photograph is always invisible : it is not it that we see 
- in short the referent adheres." (2) 
This is his first major point, one to which he returns in the second 
part of his book. 
His second observation is included in a description of his 
feelings while being photographed. Once he feels the scrutiny of the 
lens he changes, transforming himself into image - his image, the image 
which he desires, the photographer's image etc. : it is the advent of 
himself as "other". 
"When I discover myself in the product of this operation 
what I see is that I have become Total Image, which is to 
say, Death in person ... turned ferociously into an 
object - I am put at their mercy, at their disposal, 
classified in a file, ready for the subtlest 
deceptions." 13) 
I will leave this concept of Photographic Death for the moment, 
and discuss it when I deal with the second part of his book. Suffice to 
say that Barthes has made an observation that when photographed, a 
living subject is turned into an object. 
In the last section of Part One, he struggles to define the 
attraction that, for him, existed in various photographs. There were 
two elements whose co-presence established the particular interest he 
took. The first he termed "studium", an enthusiastic interest, a ' 
trained interest derived from shared experience, whether emotional, 
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practical or historical. Its basis was cultural and common. Most 
photographs provoked only a general, or polite, interest ; they were 
invested with no more than "studium". The second element would break or 
punctuate the "studium". The "punctum" was private and incommunicable, 
with the power to expand the image beyond what was seen "... as if the 
image launched desire beyond what it permits us to see." (4) (One should 
note here his linking of "punctum" with desire). 
Part Two : 
In this second half of his search for the nature of photography, 
Barthes uses as his guide a photo of his mother taken in early childhood 
(the Winter Garden Photograph). It was the only one out of many that, 
for him, truthfully showed the essence of the face he loved and from it 
he derived his theory of the noeme of photography. 
"What I had noted at the beginning in a free and easy 
manner, under cover of method, i.e. that every photograph 
is somehow co-natural with its referent, I was 
re-discovering, overwhelmed by the truth of the image. I 
call photographic referent not the optionally real thing 
to which an image or sign refers but the necessarily real 
thing which has been placed before the lens, without 
which there could be no photograph. In photography I can 
never deny that the thing has been there. There is a 
superimposition here, of reality and of the past. And 
since this restraint exists only for photography, we must 
consider it, by reduction as the very essence, the noeme 
of photography. The name of photography's noeme will 
therefore be 'that-has-been' - what I see has been here 
in this place which extends between infinity and the 
subject. It has been here and yet immediately separated, 
it has been absolutely, irrefutably present and yet 
already deferred. ... I had identified truth and reality 
in a unique emotion, in which I henceforth placed the 
nature, the genius of photography."(5) 
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Barthes states that the photograph is literally an emanation of 
the referent - "from a real body, which was there, proceed radiations 
which ultimately touch me who am here." (8) He is not the only one to 
reach this conclusion. Both Susan Sontag and Rosalind Krauss state that 
the photograph is not only an image but a trace. For Krauss it is a 
transfer from the real, "a photochemically processed trace causally 
connected to that thing in the world to which it refers." (7) Sontag, in 
her book, On Photography, describes photographs as deathmasks or 
footprints, they are stencils off the real (Sontag, Susan : On 
Photography : Penguin Books, N.Y., 1979). 
I am going to leave Barthes with his noeme "that-has-been" and 
explore instead the world of the Thinking Photographer as espoused by 
Victor Burgin, John Tagg, Alan Sekula and others. A quote from Julia 
Ballerini will serve as a general introduction. She writes : 
"Photographs are meshed into our worlds in ways 
incomparable to those of any other medium. Not only is 
their population the most dense of all imagery but 
increasingly our contacts with situations tends to be 
filtered through them. Photographs are closely bonded to 
the world in that their images are the only ones caused 
by their referents. Despite all artifice or any apparent 
lack of it, their subjects are here before us in a state 
of actually having been there. Whether acknowledged in a 
glance or given closer scrutiny all photographs 
inevitably oscillate between the actualities of 'here' 
and 'there' and summon connections invisible in the 
imagery itself." 8) 
What is claimed here is that it is precisely Barthes' noeme 
"that-has-been" which has so intricately woven photography into our 
lives - to the extent that it shapes our perception of the way things 
are, our notion of reality. 
Victor Burgin, in an essay entitled "Looking at Photographs" 
states : 
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"Recently, theory has moved to consider not only the 
structure of appropriation to ideology of that which is 
uttered in a photograph, but also to examine the 
ideological implications inscribed within the performance 
of the utterance". (9) 
Not only photographs themselves (this is understandable) but their very 
structure of representation - not only the object depicted but the way 
it is depicted (angle of view, composition, framing etc.) all work in 
subtle ways to reinforce ideology. Burgin's project entails an extended 
analysis, constructed across the practice of photography, of the role of 
psychic structures in the formation of daily reality and of the 
particular part played by photography as a central ideological 
apparatus. Two elements are important to this study - one, the degree 
to which the detours of memory, fantasy and other primary process 
operations infiltrate the process of looking, defining its discursive 
dimension ; the other, the way the photographic apparatus itself 
reflects unconscious structures of fascination. 
In order to deal with the ideological formation of the photo 
image one must first examine the truth value of that image, as a 
representation of visual reality. "The photo", says Alan Sekula, "is 
imagined to have a primitive core of meaning, devoid of all cultural 
determination." ( " ) This elevates the photograph to the legal status of 
document and testimonial, giving it a mythic aura of neutrality. John 
Tagg would counter such a proposition by arguing that photographs are 
not automatic records of things seen, they have no language of their 
own. The photographer turns his or her camera on a world of objects 
already constructed as a world of uses, values and meanings - "though in 
the perceptual process these may not appear as such but only as 
) qualities discerned in a natural recognition of what is there. oil 	In 
other words, things are never simply things to us - in the very moment 
of their being perceived as objects they are placed within an 
intelligible system of relations. They take their place or position 
within an ideology. All that constitutes reality for us is, then, 
impregnated with meanings ; these meanings are the contingent products 
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of history and in sum reflect our ideology : the naturalness of the 
world ostensibly open before the camera is a deceit. Objects presented 
to it are already in use in the production of meaning and the 
photographer has no choice but to operate on such meanings. The basis 
of any mood or feeling a picture might produce, as much as any mood or 
feeling it might be thought to transmit, depends not on something 
individual or mysterious but rather on our common knowledge of the 
typical representation of prevailing social facts and values. (12) 
For Burgin, Barthes' simple statement "this-has-been" is 
unacceptable. It is precisely the acceptance of just such a statement 
and the connotations it involves - the equation of 'this-has-been' 
therefore this is truth/reality - that he is arguing against. "A 
photograph," he states, "is not to be reduced to pure form, nor window 
on the world, nor is it a gangway to the presence of an author. The 
photograph is a place of work, a structured structuring space within 
which the reader deploys and is deployed by what codes he/she is 
familiar with in order to make sense. Photography is one signifying 
system among others in a society which produces the ideological subject 
in the same moment in which they communicate their ostensible 
contents". (13) If one is to agree with Burgin, then one cannot separate 
the notion of the 'photograph' from its implication in the production of 
meaning in a society. 
Burgin starts his argument by observing (as does Barthes) that 
it is almost as unusual to pass a day without seeing a photograph as it 
is to miss seeing writing. Photographs permeate the environment, 
facilitating the formation, reflection and inflection of what we take 
for granted. He states that it has previously been most usual to view 
photography in the light of art but to do this consigns to shadow the 
greater part of our experience of it - it is a partial account which 
leaves the social role of photography largely untouched. Photographs 
offer themselves gratuitously (as Barthes says, photos come from the 
world to me). As a free and familiar coinage of meaning, photography 
shares an attribute of language, but this autonomous language of 
photography is never free from the determinations of language itself - 
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even a photograph which has no writing on or around it is traversed by 
language when read by a viewer - in memory and association. 
"The intelligibility of the photograph is no simple thing 
- photographs are texts inscribed in terms of what we may 
call 'photographic discourse' but this discourse like any 
other engages in discourses beyond itself. The 
photographic text is the site of a complex 
intertextuality, an overlapping series of previous texts 
taken for granted. These prior texts are autonomous - 
are latent to the manifest text and may only be read 
across it symptomatically - photographic imagery is 
typically laconic. The notion of the purely visual image 
() is nothing but Edenic fiction. " 14  
Burgin stresses that regardless of how much we may strain to 
maintain a disinterested aesthetic mode of apprehension, an appreciation 
of the purely visual, when we look at an image it is instantly and 
irreversibly integrated and collated with the intricate psychic network 
of our knowledge. It is this which pre-constructs the photographer's 
intuitive response to these fragments of the flux of events in the 
world, producing his/her recognition that there is something there to 
photograph. "It is neither necessary nor desirable to make 
psychological assumptions concerning the intentions of the photographer, 
it is the pre-constituted field of discourse which is the substantial 
'author' here - photograph and photographer alike are its products and, 
in the act of seeing, so is the viewer." (15) 
So far, two major points have been made : firstly, the notion of 
the photograph as a neutral view of reality, as a window on the world, 
if you like, is a myth ; and secondly, there is no pure image or 
language of the photograph, everything we perceive is already fixed 
firmly in ideology. 
The article 'Representation and Sexuality' by Kate Linker gives 
a clear insight into the arguments previously stated and prepares the 
ground for those to come. I quote : 
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."What has become apparent is the role• of these varied 
. representations, founded on but not identical to 
language, in constructing what we know as reality. Since 
reality can be known only through the forms that 
• articulate it there can be no reality outside of 
representation, ... . With its synonyms truth and 
meaning, it is a fiction produced by its cultural 
representations, a construction discursively shaped and 
solidified through repetition, ... . Representation, 
hardly neutral, acts to regulate and define the subjects 
it addresses, positioning them by class and sex, in 
active or passive relations to meaning - hence the forms 
of discourse are at once forms of definition, means of 
limitation, modes of power.  16) 
In other words, it is no longer a question of "this-has-been" but of 
reality constructed by a culture for a culture. Linker stresses that 
Burgin's practice is directed against a formalist conception of 
photography as a purely visual medium and of the photograph as a 
transparent reflection of its subject. Such formalism asserts 
photographic neutrality based in adequation of image and meaning, and is 
countered by Burgin with the conception of the image as a discursive 
form whose reading emits, intervolves and variously engages psychic, 
social and institutional texts. Photographs are apprehended through 
language. This scripto-visual condition defines the photograph in its 
social use outside the visual and formal constraints that characterize 
its artistic practice. What this indicates is that meaning cannot be 
located within the image as a pre-existing or expressed characteristic, 
but is continually displaced to an intertextual fabric whose 
elaborations parallel the mechanisms of dreams. From the laconic 
structure of the manifest elements unfold chains of association and 
fluxive references which "... spread out into the intricate network of 
our world of thought, consciousness, subliminal revery, pre-conscious 
thought, the unconscious, the way of phantasy" (17) . It is in this 
context that Burgin places photographic imagery. The direct, redundant 
relation between image and text situates the reader in a passive, rather 
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than active relationship, as consumer not provider of meaning and this 
confirmation and reinforcement of subject positions has made photography 
a prime instrument of ideology. 
The equation of the photograph with ideological tool and its 
implication in the production and circulation of meaning in society has 
been developed as one of Burgin's strongest arguments. Before exploring 
his ideas further, it is interesting to juxtapose his notion of 
photograph/ideological apparatus with a statement by Barthes, who 
manages to give a subtle twist to the meaning of reality in photographs. 
"The photograph's essence," he says, "is to ratify what 
it represents, it is authentication itself. Photography 
never lies, or rather it can lie as to the meaning of a 
thing, being by nature tendentious, never as to its 
existence. Its force is superior to anything the human 
mind can or can have conceived to assure us of reality 
... Every photograph is a certificate of presence. This 
certificate is the new embarrassment which its invention 
has introduced into the family of images. It is neither 
image nor reality - a new being really, a reality one can 
no longer touch. "(18) 
Barthes uses this argument to side-step the notion of the 
photograph as representing a fabricated reality. For him the photograph 
is not a copy of reality, but an emanation of past reality, bearing 
testimony to time, not the object photographed. 
"I now know there exists another punctum. 	This new 
punctum, which is no longer of form but of intensity, is 
Time, the lacerating emphasis of the noeme 
'that-has-been', its pure representation. 19) 
Here once again the spectre of photographic Death is allowed to 
surface. According to Barthes the photograph, by showing the absolute 
past, tells of Death in the future. He states that society is currently 
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undergoing a crisis with the notion of death and is quick to point to 
• the .irony of a people who use the photographic image as proof of life - 
an image that produces death while attempting to preserve life. He 
writes that Death (or its symbolic appearance) must be somewhere in a 
society ; if it is no longer in religion it must be elsewhere. 
"Contemporary with the withdrawal of rites, photography 
corresponds to the intrusion in our modern society of a 
symbolic death, outside of religion, outside of ritual, a 
() kind of abrupt dive into literal death. „20  
Barthes' use of the word 'death' in relation to photography is 
problematic, and, if seen in the light of ethical considerations which I 
will deal with a little latter on, disturbing. However, to return to 
his previous statement, I do believe he has a point. 
In his book, Western Attitudes Towards Death, Philippe Aries 
describes four ways of dealing with death in European culture. Early 
beliefs were defined in an acceptance and familiarity with death : "We 
shall all die”. The twelfth century saw a concern for the individuality 
of each person introduced into the idea of the collective destiny of the 
species, stressing the importance given throughout the entire modern 
period to the self, to one's own existence, (one's own death). From the 
eighteenth century onwards, however, death would be thought of as a 
break. The emphasis was less on one's own death than with the death of 
the other person ("thy death"), whose loss and memory inspired in the 
nineteenth and twentieth century the new cult of tombs and cemeteries. 
Memory conferred upon the dead a sort of immortality and their monuments 
were the visible sign of their permanence. The Monument perpetuated 
Memory. 
This is, I think, what Barthes is alluding to when he writes 
that earlier societies managed so that memory, the substitute for life, 
was eternal and that at least the thing which spoke death should itself 
be immortal (this was the Monument). But by making the mortal 
photograph into the general and somehow natural witness of what has 
been, modern society has renounced the Monument. (21) 
In the twentieth century there was, in Aries' words, a brutal 
revolution in traditional ideas and feeling. Death, so omnipresent in 
the past that it was familiar, would be effaced, would disappear, become 
shameful and forbidden. It was a technical phenomenon obtained by a 
cessation of care. Death has become taboo - the cause of the interdict 
is the need for happiness, the moral duty and the social obligation to 
contribute to the collective happiness by avoiding any cause for sorrow. 
To counter death we now have the photograph, which proves existence and 
certifies experience and happiness, (the denying alibi of the 
distractedly alive). 
This is so - up to a point - for as Susan Sontag states, 
"photography is a - elegiac art, most subjects photographed are just by 
virtue of being photographed touched by pathos"( 22)  , ("the photograph is 
without future, this is its pathos, its melancholy" - Camera Lucida, 
p.90). Sontag warns that to take a photograph is to participate in 
another person's mortality. 
"Photographs show people as being so irrefutably there - 
they state the vulnerability of lives leading towards 
their own destruction, and this link between photography 
and death haunts all people". (23) 
It is in Barthes' description of the photograph as turning 
subject into object that, I think, he comes closest to any notion of 
death. He writes, "with the photograph we enter into flat death ... if 
I like a photograph, if it disturbs me I linger over it, the photograph 
justifies this desire even if it does not satisfy it - ... Alas, however 
hard I look I discover nothing. I obtafn this sole knowledge, long 
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since possessed at first glance, that this indeed has been ... I must 
therefore submit to this. law. I cannot penetrate,- cannot reach into the. 
photograph- I can only sweep it with my glance like a smooth surface. 
The photograph is flat, platitudinous in the fine sense of the word, (as 
if the horror of death were not precisely its platitude) - I exhaust 
myself realising that this has been". (  24) 
To equate a photograph with death must necessarily involve the 
notion of violence and aggression in the act of photographing itself. I 
introduce this here because it raises ethical considerations linked with 
my interpretation of Barthes' notion of photographic death (subject into 
object), and, both his idea of death, violence and aggression are 
implicated in the act of looking itself. 
Sontag writes, "the very passivity and ubiquity of the 
photographic record is photography's message, its aggression - it is 
implicit in every use of the camera. To photograph is to appropriate 
the thing photographed, it means putting oneself into a certain relation 
to the world that feels like knowledge and therefore like power. It 
turns people into objects that can be symbolically possessed." (25) 
Sontag extends Barthes' concept of the referent to a point where it is 
not only like its subject, it is seen as part of, an extension of and a 
potent means of gaining control over it, of acquiring it. Through being 
photographed, something becomes part of a system of information (as 
distinct from experience), filtered into systems of classification and 
storage. (I cannot help but remember Barthes' comment that "they put me 
at their mercy, at their disposal, classified in a file, ready for the 
subtlest deceptions." Camera Lucida, p.14). As Rosalind Krauss has 
observed, the camera frame is an image of mastery (the capture of the 
photographic subject) and the camera's act of seeing is essentialised as 
a superior power of focus and selection. Thus we have a picture of the 
photographic act as being implicitly violent and aggressive. (26) 
To my mind, this concept is intricately bound to recent 
psychoanalytic theories concerning the act of looking itself. Burgin 
writes that the signifying system of photography, like that of classical 
- 13 - 
painting, at once depicts a scene and the gaze of the spectator - an 
object and a viewing subject. Photographic representation implies both 
a framed scene or object and a controlling point of view. The 
subject/Viewer is placed as geometric point of origin of the scene, in 
an imaginary relationship with real space, this scene both radiates from 
and returns to this controlling position occupied by the camera and 
conferred, in looking, on the viewer. It is the medium's putative 
transparency that bestows the illusion of naturalness, effacing the 
image's fabrication under the guise of objectivity. To the point of 
view, the system of representation adds the frame through which the 
world is organized into a coherence it lacks. "The perspective system 
of representation represents before all else, a look, implying subject 
and objectified other,, .(27)  But the clue to the social predominance of 
objectifying modes of mastery is to be found far earlier in psychic 
structures of fascination. "Our conviction that we are free to choose 
what we make of a photo hides the complicity to which we are recruited 
in the very act of looking". (28) Looking is not indifferent, it is 
always implicated in a system of control. 
Freud first designated the sexual pleasures of looking as an 
independent drive - scopophilia, which assumed both active and passive 
forms. These psychic implications are elaborated by Lacan who 
identifies a double inscription of psychic life in the look - the 
essentially autoerotic, narcissistic moment of the mirror phrase, the 
moment of identification of and with the self, (an erotic investment in 
one's unified image) and the look which is a component of the externally 
directed sexual drive to objectify the other - voyeurism. His 
discussion of the look emphatically returns to this theme of the look as 
a guarantor of imaginary self coherence. The two are conjoined in their 
imaginary or imagistic function of fending off lack through the 
investment of self coherence. "The primary suturing instance of the 
discourse of still photography takes the form of an indentification of 
the subject/viewer with the camera position and this shifts between the 
poles of voyeurism and narcissism. In the former instance subjecting 
the other as object to an inquisitive and controlling surveillance in 
which seeing is dislocated from being seen and in the latter effecting 
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dual identification with both the camera and the individual 
depicted." (29) 
John Tagg imagines a history of photography as an insistent 
practice inserted into the very heart of the modern social order and 
characterised by a double momentum. An ever more intimate and exacting 
attention to bodies and a diverse constitution of space as itself a 
realm of phantasy and control, submission and consent, a space of the 
Imaginary and Ideological. On the one side all kinds of portraiture, 
time and motion studies, photographs in official documents and files, 
humanist documentaries and pornography. On the other the landscape 
tradition, aerial surveys, astronomical photography, micro photography 
topographical records, certain kinds of advertising images and so on. 
"Two kinds of longing. Two kinds of subjection. (The gaze has both 
passion and perspective)." (30) 
The argument has turned to the act of looking as a drive to 
master, to objectify, as a means of control, to the photograph as a 
reflection of unconscious structures of fascination. Burgin further 
elaborates this with the conclusion that the wholeness, coherence and 
identity which we attribute to a photograph is a projection, a refusal 
of an impoverished reality in favour of an imaginary plentitude. It is 
an imaginary investiture of the real which he links to Lacan's theory of 
imaginary self coherence. (31) Photography, as is film, is described as 
a sort of 'wish fulfilling machine' - an instrument of phantasy and 
desire. This seems to be in direct correlation to Barthes' concept of 
the photo as an object of desire, (Myself I see only the desired object) 
and his designation of the punctum of a photograph as a kind of subtle 
beyond. 32) 
Desire then, or the look, is crucial for this discourse on, 
against and about photography. For Barthes, "the look accomplishes the 
unheard of identification of reality with truth - it becomes at once 
evidential and exclamative - bearing the effigy to that crazy point 
where effect (love, desire) is a guarantee of Being. It then approaches 
to all intents madness." (33) For Victor Burgin and associates the look 
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• has more sinister connotations - it is irrevocably tied to the concept . 
. 	of power. 
Here too, the violence, aggression and even Barthes' theory of 
photographic death are more understandable. The link-up is easy to 
follow. To photograph someone or something turns subject into object - 
objects that can be symbolically possessed - open before the controlling 
gaze - the look - the invitation to power. As stated by Sontag : "to 
photograph is to appropriate the thing photographed. It means putting 
oneself in a certain relation to the world that feels like knowledge and 
therefore like power." (34) With this statement the ideas as argued by 
Burgin and associates pass into the realm of the constant articulation 
of power as knowledge and knowledge as power which the French 
philosopher and historian, Michel Foucault, has explored. Foucault 
argues that each society establishes what he calls its 'regime of truth' 
- that is, the types of discourse it harbours and causes to function as 
true, the techniques and procedures which are valorised for obtaining 
truth, the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as 
true. It is within this regime of truth that we must situate the 
photograph. 
To quote Burgin : "Foucault has directed our attention to the 
action of power in the truth effect. Society is ordered on the basis of 
what it holds to be true. Truth does not stand outside of discourse. 
It is produced by material forms of discourse inscribed in concrete 
practices" (35) (i.e. no transcendent truth, only that which we make for 
ourselves). The current interest in Foucault lies in his recognition of 
the political within the ideological through the intimate connection of 
the production of knowledge with the exercise of power. "Our modern 
innocence speaks of power as if it were a single thing - on one side 
those who have it, on the other those who do not. We have believed that 
power was an exemplary political object, we believe now that power is 
also an ideological object, that it creeps in where we do not recognise 
it at first - into institutions, into teaching, but still that it is 
always one thing." (36) (Barthes) 
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Here we have a concept of the photograph as linked to ideology, 
which in turn works within our society to reinforce dominant notions of 
truth, knowledge and power - necessarily Capitalistic power. John Tagg 
links the photograph with the concept of currency. We should also note 
here Burgin's use of the phrase 'coinage of meaning' and Sekula's notion 
of task, of the photograph as being someone's investment in a message : 
"they are pieces of special paper, tokens, items produced by a certain 
elaborate mode of production and distributed, circulated and consumed 
within a given set of social relations. Photographs are objects of 
manipulation." (37) What he is stressing is the absolute continuity of 
the photograph's ideological existence as a material object, whose 
currency and value arise in certain distinct and historically specific 
social practices that are ultimately a function of the state. 
Photographs are used to naturalise our beliefs and practices. "We live 
according to a generalised image repertoire, only images exist and are 
produced and consumed. What characterizes the so-called advanced 
societies is that they today consume images, and no longer like those of 
the past, beliefs." 38)  (Barthes) 
According to John Tagg, we cannot be innocent of the values that 
adhere in the realism of photos. "We may live in the space of the 
picture, its reality, its ideological field - but as the picture draws 
us in we are drawn into its orbit, the gravitational field of its 
realism. We seem to experience a loss of light from the picture to us 
and from ourselves into the picture. We are invited to dream in the 
ideological space of the photo. It is now that we should remember that 
dreams really do have a meaning and are far from being the expression of 
a fragmentary activity of the brain - when the work of interpretation 
has been completed we perceive that the dream is the fulfilment of a 
() wish". 39 	Barthes too, talks of entering a photograph - the object of 
his desire, of fulfilment. "Inescapably I passed beyond the unreality 
of the thing represented, I entered crazily into the spectacle, into the 
image, taking into my arms what is dead, what is going to die - gone mad 
for pity's sake. "(40) 
Finally these two different, yet strangely parallel thoughts on 
photography separate. For Barthes, the noeme of photography is simple, 
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banal - "that-has-been" - but such evidence, he writes, can be a sibling 
of madness. "The photograph is an extended loaded evidence - as if it . 
caricatured not the figure of what it represents, but its very 
existence. The fact that this object has indeed existed, that it has 
been there where I see it. Here is where the madness is - for until 
this day no representation could assure me of the past of a thing except 
by intermediaries - but with the photograph my certainty is immediate - 
no one in the world can undeceive me. The photograph then becomes a 
bizarre medium - a new form of hallucination - false on the level of 
perception, true on the level of time. A temporal hallucination so to 
speak, a modest, shared hallucination - on the one hand, it is there, on 
the other, but it has indeed been - a mad image, chafed by reality. 041) 
The crux of the matter is this : photography as an ideological 
apparatus/weapon that constructs/uses us as much as we use/construct it 
(as much as we speak it so it speaks/shapes us (42) ) as opposed to 
Barthes' "that-has-been". 
The Thinking Photographers and their ilk have pulled the 
world of the photograph apart, and rightly so, but I cannot help 
thinking of a statement by Barthes which says - "so much, no more". 
What is it really that they have done? In trying to uncover the 
ideological role played by photographs, they seem to me, to have at one 
and the same time, enmeshed it even more firmly into the way we perceive 
things. 	(As was pointed out, we have a psychological investment in 
looking). Ideology is not something 'out there', to be seen through ... 
it is unconscious. After all that has been said, Barthes"mad image' 
still remains, 'that-has-been', linked to reality, to our perception of 
it, linked to the look and to desire. 
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SEMINAR PAPER 2. 
My previous paper initiated an attempt at understanding the 
various theories circulating around photographic practice. I explored 
the notions of aggression and power implicit in the photograph, their 
implication in the process of looking and the idea of the photo as an 
instrument of ideology, a product of the field of discourse, in which 
photographer, photograph and viewer alike, were caught. To sum up, "the 
camera and lens were regarded simply as pieces of machinery which 
allowed an image, a duplicate of the world, to be transferred onto film. 
A photograph stood as evidence that whatever was inside the frame of the 
image really happened, was really there, it was authentic, convincing, 
true. But photography actually involved just as much artifice as any 
other mode of visual representation. Photos were no more innocent of 
cultural formation than any other products of human society." (1) 
Barthes' Camera Lucida, on the other hand, named photography's essence 
as being 'that-has-been', linking it with desire and madness. 
During the research my fascination with Camera Lucida was 
reinforced and I came to the conclusion that although 'The Thinking 
Photographers' had exposed the myth of photographic authenticity, in 
concentrating on uncovering the role of photography within ideology and 
the subtle ways it is enforced within the image, they had somehow missed 
the point - indeed they seemed to entangle these images even more firmly 
into our perception of things. 
This paper, then, is intended as an expansion of these ideas. I 
concluded with the words - "my next paper will be all about desire." It 
is, in a manner of speaking : about my desire to finger the pulse of the 
peculiar power of the photographic image, to find Barthes' madness and 
the reasons for its provocation. (Barthes did attempt an explanation, 
which is why I continue to find his book fascinating.) I think there is 
more to the story than the fact that photos are "stencils" or "causally 
connected traces", even more than "that-has-been", as Barthes so 
eloquently put it. 
In this second paper I have decided to start my search with a 
loose exploration of ideas associated with words currently used to 
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explain photography's fascination. Words such as "desire", "fetishism", 
"disavowal". These are general topics, necessary, but important only in 
so far as they are pieces of the puzzle - the search intensifies in the 
area of psycho-analysis and the formation of the human subject. 
The Photograph and Desire 
Throughout his book (Camera Lucida) Barthes continually links 
photographs to desire. That photos can and do provoke desire needs no 
argument, but how and why bears a more thorough investigation. 
In The Power of the Image, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 
1985, p.12) Annette Kuhn writes that beauty or sexuality is desirable 
exactly to the extent that it is idealised or unattainable. For 
Barthes, the most erotic portion of a body is where the garment gapes. 
It is intermittence which is exotic, the intermittence of skin flashing 
between two articles of clothing, between two edges. It is this flash 
itself which seduces, or rather, the staging of an appearance as 
disappearance. 
"What pleasure wants is the sight of a loss, the seam, 
the cut, the dissolve, it is the seam between edges, the 
fault or flaw which excites desire." (2) 
Sartre might extend this with the question, "Does one usually 
want what one desires?" - usually not - a desire is never satisfied to 
the letter precisely because of the abyss that separates the real from 
the imaginary. (3) 
To look at a photograph beyond a certain period of time is to 
become frustrated. The image, by degrees, becomes a veil behind which 
we now desire to see. ("As if the image launched desire beyond what it 
permits us to see." Camera Lucida, p.59). With a photograph we never 
really quite have it - it is illusion. The photograph is object as 
nothing, it is, of course, actually not there. Desire is maintained 
precisely because desire remains ungratified. 
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Why desire is never satisfied can be explained in the Lacanian 
terminology of desire/lack. Meaning, or a place in patriarchal 
structure, is attained only at the price of loss. It is in this lack 
(the effect of a primordial absence) that Lacan bases the instigation of 
desire, which is distinguished from want in that its satisfaction is 
never attained. Desire is deviation, ex-centric, constantly forced away 
from the aim and into displacement. (If we did not lack we would not 
desire.) There is no adequation between the need and the demand that 
conveys it, it is the gap between them that constitutes desire. Desire 
is a perpetual effect of symbolic articulation. It is not an appetite - 
it is essentially excentric and insatiable, coordinated not with the 
object that would seem to satisfy it, but with the object that causes 
it. (4) 
"Desire and the secret collusion with which it envelops 
the pleasure of knowing and of dominating with 
jouissance, these amount to no other derangement of 
instinct than that of being caught in the rails - 
eternally stretching forth towards the desire for 
something else - of metonymy". (5) 
The photograph then, could be seen as a gap through which we 
desire to enter. But no matter how strong the illusion, how strong the 
desire, it remains isolated, sealed, a tiny world, separated, cut off 
... perpetually unattainable ... infinitely desirable, the site of 
Barthes' flaw or fault. 
Photographs as Fetish 
Victor Burgin writes that man's desire in/for the image is 
lodged under the sign of 'fetishism. The fetish is that fragment which 
allays the fetishist's castration anxiety by serving as a reassuring 
substitute for that which he construes as 'missing' from the woman's 
body." ) Normally conceived as a masculine practice - but also feminine 
- it intervenes as an effort to suture loss, to bind up, to 
4 
psychologically allay the anxiety of castration. The photographic look 
is ineluctably implicated in the structure of fetishism, for the 
photograph, like the fetish, is the result of a look which has 
instantaneously and forever isolated, frozen, a fragment of space and 
time. 
In an article, 'Photography and Fetish'" ) , Christian Metz 
observes that photographs are more likely to work as fetishes because of 
their size and the fact that they can allow the possibility of a 
lingering look. Metz draws a parallel between the timelessness of 
photography and the timelessness of the unconscious and of memory 
(immobility and silence lend authority to a photograph). The snapshot 
is an instantaneous abduction of the object out of the world into 
another world - into another kind of time. The photographic take is 
immediate and definitive, like the constitution of the fetish in the 
unconscious, fixed by a glance in childhood, unchanged and always active 
later. He quotes Dubois, remarking that with each photo a tiny piece of 
time brutally and forever escapes its ordinary fate and is thus 
protected against its own loss. The fetish too means both loss and 
protection against loss : "fetishism remains a token of triumph over the 
threat of castration and a protection against it." (8) This act of 
cutting off a piece of space and time - of keeping it unchanged while 
the world around continues to change - is a compromise. The compromise 
consists in making the seen retrospectively unseen by a disavowal of the 
perception and in stopping the look once and for all on an object, the 
fetish. Metz also introduces a new term which he calls the 'off-frame'. 
For him the off-frame effect in photography results from a definitive 
cutting off, which figures castration and is figured by the click of the 
camera (as was Barthes' death). The spectator has no knowledge of the 
contents of the off-frame, yet cannot help imagining, hallucinating. 
It insists on its status as excluded by the force of its absence inside 
the rectangle of paper and is reminiscent of the description of lack in 
the Freudian theory of the fetish (also perhaps a hint of that desire 
that spirals around it). It marks the place of an irreversible absence, 
a place from which the look has been averted forever. 
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Rosalind Krauss writes that when the fetish comes to life, some 
process has been interrupted. Her observation that this process occurs 
in the realm of the visual, anchors fetishism firmly in the area of 
visual representation. "The blow that stops time and decrees that on 
the sight of its arrest there be built the (sexually indeterminant) 
substitute of the fetish occurs in the realm of the visual - which now 
becomes the theatre for the endless rehearsals of fabricated vision." (9) 
Photographs and the Process of Disavowal 
Freud considered fetishism the prototype of that cleavage of 
belief "I know very well but ..." Photos are able to fix on our belief 
to concentrate it, to spend it all at the same time on a single object. 
Photographic representation accomplishes that separation of knowledge 
from belief which is characteristic of fetishism. The pervasive 
structure of disavowal links fetishism to the image and to fantasy, its•
motive being to maintain the imaginary unity of the subject at the cost 
of, in the face of the subject's actual splitting. "I know that the 
reality offered in this photograph is only an illusion but 
nevertheless..." 
The structure of disavowal is not confined to cases of fetishism 
proper, it is so widespread as to be almost inaccessible to critical 
attention. As Burgin says, it is as if the first repudiation of the 
maternal phallus stretched the first model of all repudiations of 
reality and constituted the origin of all those beliefs. (1°) The 
movement to and fro which ceaselessly sets off the intensity of the 
disavowal sustains the spectators' pleasure. "The spectacle is always a 
game, requiring the spectators' participation as players, accomplices. 
Never passive the spectator works, but that work is not only a work of 
decipherment, reading, elaboration of signs. It is first of all, and 
just as much, if not more, to play the game, to fool him/herself out of 
pleasure and in spite of knowledge. It is to maintain the mechanism of 
disavowal at its highest level of intensity. The more one knows the 
more difficult it is to believe and the more it is worth it to manage 
to. 11 
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Photographs and Fantasy 
would like here to draw attention to a book, The End of Art 
Theory : Criticism and Postmodernity, by Victor Burgin. In this book 
Burgin states that fetishism denies - disavows - difference. To do so 
it presents a fragment as self-sufficient. He equates the film still 
(or photograph), a material entity, with the mnemic-image, a psychic 
entity. What they have in common is that they are both fragments which 
have nevertheless achieved a sort of representative autonomy. 
He recalls Barthes' use of the word "punctum" as being a meaning 
not pinned down by words. Fragments of certain photographs moved 
Barthes in a way which was strictly incommunicable. The "punctum" was 
unpredictable and private - purely image. Burgin's particular 
understanding of the "punctum" entails an understanding of fantasy. He 
writes : "a highly cathected image fragment takes the place of, stands 
in for, a narrative. What stands out, as if in focus against an 
incomplete background of indistinct details is a situation in an image 
( 	) 
	
... we are now in the presence of fantasy.„ 1 2 	This is why 
psycho-analytical accounts of fantasy are important. 
Burgin's explanation of the role of fantasy within the 
photographic image extended my original equation of the photograph and 
desire (whether as object of, as lack or as absence) and the photograph 
as fetish (part of the process of disavowal), with its fascination. For 
me, these concepts, although giving a better understanding of the 
workings of the mind in relation to photographic imagery, fell short. 
Here was a partial account of why a photograph can maintain interest or 
excite desire. y  fascination, my consuming image - or more 
specifically my madness, had yet to be touched on. 
The madness I looked for went beyond the madness of passion and 
desire. It was elusive ; a world of illusion, a strange, haunted, half 
world neither real nor unreal. The notion of fantasy seemed to bring it 
closer. The idea of the photograph as a fantasy/dream world (not only a 
scenario of desire) - the idea of people being drawn into this image 
world, taking their place in it - was important to me. 
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Taking us back to early experiences (13) , Burgin gives the 
example of the child sucking at its mother's breast and quotes Freud's 
observation that the first wishing seems to have been a hallucinatory 
cathecting of the memory of satisfaction, adding that in this scenario 
is incorporated the Lacanian schema according to which desire insinuates 
itself between need and demand. It is directed neither to an object 
(the milk), nor to a person, but to a fantasy - the mnemic traces of 
lost satisfaction. He develops this with the assertion that the first 
fantasy is then most fundamentally motivated by the desire to fill the 
gap (photos too create gaps, leave absences) opened between the infant 
and the maternal body. A body already fantasmatically displaced in 
relation to the real. Fantasy however, is not the object of desire, but 
its setting - the subject does not pursue the object or its sign, rather 
the subject appears caught up in the sequence of images. 
The primal moment of satisfaction, in so far as it survives, 
does so as a constellation of mnemic traces, several representative 
elements linked together in a short scene. It is such a fantasy 
configuration which is indelibly inscribed as an ever-present principle 
of organization in the psychic life of the subject ; Burgin states, "it 
is precisely such an intertextual, mutual imbrication of anecdotes, 
pinned together by a fragment which allows Barthes to see his 
() punctum. " 14  Burgin also stresses the involuntary nature of the 
unconscious eruption and the fact that it may come from something 
transindividual (i.e. not personal) ; also the overall structural  
stability of the fantasy (albeit constantly subject to transformations), 
which serves to regulate and organize the otherwise formless 
displacements of desire. "To such potentially anarchic and polymorphous 
movements of desire, fantasy opposes the constancy of its forms, to the 
erratic fantasy opposes the hieratic. It is because of the 
mise-en-scOle of desire, which is fantasy, that dissemination does not 
centrifugally dissipate itself, but rather circles back on itself to 
repeat - but differently - which is to say that the movement describes 
not so much a circle closed, but a spiral, perpetually renewing itself 
by conquering new territory while nevertheless tracing the same 
figure."(15) 
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He follows this with a curious but apt analogy. He describes 
gallery walls (and what is displayed on them), as being the negative of 
cinema. The gallery is a cinema without walls in the forms of the 
countless stills and synopses to which we are exposed, these in turn 
dissolving into the broader flood of images issuing from our society of 
the spectacle. 
"The grand narrative of human existence, the meaning of 
life, the source of inspiration and legitimation of all 
social institutions and individual actions is now 
encountered in a different way - as representative 
fragments whose connections and ultimate meanings must be 
implied • a 	material 	heterogeneity 	whose 
narrative/ideological coherence depends upon a 
psychological investment - largely unconscious and 
therefore radically inaccessible to the discourses of an 
ethical and political culture - except in so far as these 
discourses themselves issue from an unconscious matrix as 
the heavily elaborated transcriptions of common fantasy 
(  scenarios. 1 6 )  
He makes the point that psycho-analysis comes into existence 
with the recognition that what we call material reality, "the real 
world", is not all that is real for us, unconscious wishes and the 
unconscious fantasies they engender are as immutable a force in our 
lives as any material existence. Drawing on Freud's observations that 
unconscious fantasy structures exert as actual a force on the life of 
the subject as do socio-economic structures, he concludes that what 
marks psychical reality is its stability, its coherence and the 
constancy of its effects upon perceptions and actions of the subject. 
"Psycho-analysis recognises no such possible state of unambiguous and 
self-possessed lucidity in which the external world is seen for and 
known as simply what it is." (17) (My emphasis.) 
Images (especially photographic) operate in a similar way to 
that of the fetish by presenting highly charged fragments (as the fetish 
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captures a fragment) that are triggered by and capable of triggering the 
fantasies of unconscious desire. Fantasies that can be just as real for 
us as reality itself. 
The subject of fantasy, however, does not finish here. Camera 
Lucida was dedicated to a book by Sartre, The Psychology of Imagination. 
Sartre states that the imaginative consciousness that we produce before 
a photo is an act, that we become aware somehow of animating it, of 
lending it life. For Sartre, one of the essential factors of the 
imaginative consciousness is that of belief (and what are photographs if 
not authentic, believable, true?). He claims that aesthetic 
contemplation (e.g. of a photo), is an induced dream and the passing 
into the real an actual waking up. His comments on the imaginary 
consciousness and dreaming are worth describing in detail, and it is 
interesting to hold the thought that, although his descriptions are 
mainly about dreams, he could be talking about photographs. (18) 
He states that the time of unreal objects is itself unreal, it 
has no characteristics whatsoever of perceptual time, it is a shadow of 
time. The world of imagery is completely isolated and can be entered 
only by unrealising oneself in it. A complete world can appear to him 
as an image and this world closes on his consciousness. Consciousness 
is taken in, is fascinated by a swarm of impressions, it grasps them as 
being this or that object, as an image, as standing for this or that and 
then suddenly it is completely in the game (the game of disavowal, of 
spectacle). It apprehends these shining impressions as standing for an 
object which is at the farthest remove from a world, the contents of 
which are lost in the fog. "In its relation to desire reality appears 
only as marginal." (19) 
Consciousness is unable to engage in reflection, it is carried 
along by its own decline ("we seem to experience a loss of our own 
reality - are invited to dream in the ideological space of the 
photograph," says Burgin (20) ). Sartre continues, we cannot free 
ourselves from it, we are fascinated with it. This world is sufficient 
unto itself, it can neither be dissipated nor connected by a perception, 
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since it does not belong to the domain of the real. It is its very 
unreality which puts it beyond reach and which gives it a compact 
opacity and strength. The feeling that is aroused is a feeling of 
belonging in this imaginary world in which one must be unreal if one is 
to enter. Once an imaginary self occurs in the fascinating world of the 
dream it closes - it is no longer an imaginary spectacle before him 
because of the fact that he is viewing it, now he is represented in it. 
Sartre also comments that our imaginary self breaks into pieces 
and disappears at contact with reality - yielding its place to the real 
self. For the real and the imaginary cannot co-exist, being a matter of 
two types of objects, feelings and actions that are completely 
irreducible. In light of what is to follow, however, I wonder if they 
can and do both exist in the unconscious and in photographs ; and if so, 
does this possibly explain their fascination? 
Stephen Heath places a different emphasis on fantasy (or rather 
as to why we fantasise) with his emphasis on the experience of the 
subject in language (i.e. us) as an experience of its lack-in-being, the 
lack of its aphanisis or fading. (21)  It is because it parries this 
moment of lack that it is henceforth held in the ceaselessly displacing 
join of symbolic and imaginary - separating, responding, putting on 
images, caught in a specific problem of representation and fantasy (the 
postponement of the truth of division, of aphanisis). It is because it 
parries this moment of lack that an image comes to the position of 
bearing all the cost of desire. 
Although he is referring to film, his conclusions hold true for 
photographs as well. The film (or photo) proposes for the subject it 
includes and creates in a scenario of desire fulfilled, a subject bound 
up in the consistence of the imaginary. It is an elaboration of an 
imaginary order of wholeness, an image in which the ego seeks resolution 
as totality. (22) The basic apparatus of identification starts with the 
importance of the look. The characters look, the camera looks, the 
spectators look (the spectator can do no other than identify with the 
camera). It is a filling in, a completion of the subject, the 
translation of plurality into a certain history - the single vision, a 
coherence of vision, of exactly a vision. 
The apparatus of look and identification establish the viewer in 
the totalising security of looking at looking. The spectator is 
dispersed to be re-established in mastery. What is involved is an "... 
imagination of the ego, the setting of an ideal movement of desire and 
image, the spectator emancipated, unhindered by the existence of bodies, 
mobile in his/her images, the free play of an egocentric appropriation 
and fantasy relation." (23/ Fantasy is the very regime of the image as 
totality. 
"The image is never pure, never an image. 	Strictly 
speaking indeed the image is not an order of the visible 
but of the invisible, a speculator that adjoins real, 
symbolic, imaginary, the subject against difference, 
transformation." (24) 
The human subject, as formed in language, is a subject split, a lack --
the photograph forms a kind of idealised world which is his/hers to 
enter and possess. 
Evidently fantasy and desire go hand-in-hand, Heath's 
explanation of why we may desire to enter an image verifies this. It 
did seem, however, that the scope of my search had been broadened 
considerably. Partially with . Burgin's observation of the strength of 
fantasy and of the role it plays in shaping our perceptions - (I think 
that Sartre's description of his dream world, which I equate with the 
world of imagery, describes this beautifully) - but also with the 
inclusion of the concept of the human subject as lack, a subject split 
and divided, itself a parody of images. 
Here my search turned to an investigation of the Freudian and 
Lacanian theories of the subject as formed and divided by language and 
the implications these hold for our discussion of desire, of lack, of 
fantasy and the unconscious. To explain briefly, what unfolds is a 
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concept of a subject which continually shapes and forms itself according 
to an ideal, an ideal that is imposed from without. In the course of 
this the subject becomes divided, split and this lack becomes the 
driving force which propels it endlessly towards an identity which it 
can never quite grasp. 
Heath writes that the unconscious is a concept forged on the 
trace of what operates to constitute the subject. (25) The operation 
here is that of the order of the symbolic (or language) as cause of the 
subject ; and the place of the symbolic, the locus of the operation, is 
the place of the Other. Hence there are two domains, the subject and 
the Other, with the unconscious between them their active break. 
The unconscious is the discourse of the Other and is structured 
like a language (here the concept of language is extended as a form of 
knowledge - 'La langue' which goes well beyond everything the being who 
speaks is capable of stating). 
"The Other was there long before we came in the world and 
( its circulating structures determine us as subjects. " 26)  
Burgin states that there is no subject prior to its construction 
across the field of representations (27) . It is a vicious circle to say 
that we are speaking beings ; according to Heath we are 'speakings' - a 
word that can be advantageously substituted for the unconscious. 
Formation of the Human Subject - The Mirror Stage 
Lacan takes the child's mirror image, later to be replaced by 
language, as the model and basis for its future identifications. To 
quote, "The mirror stage is a drama whose internal thrust is 
precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation - and which manufactures 
for the subject the succession of phantasies that extends from a 
fragmented body image to a form of its totality, and lastly to the 
assumption of the armour of an alienating identity which will mark with 
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its rigid structure the subject's entire mental development. 028)(my 
emphasis.) As shown, this image, this specular self, although salutory 
for the child since it gives it the first sense of a coherent identity, 
is a fiction because it conceals or freezes the infant's lack of motor 
co-ordination and the fragmentation of its drives. Furthermore, that 
moment only has meaning in relation to the presence and look of the 
mother (Other) who guarantees its reality for the child. What we have 
here is a strange triangle of relationships that is set up between the 
imago, ideal image, the mother - or Other - and the subject/child. 
Burgin provides an interesting comment here in relation to 
photography. Emphasising the surface and boundary of the mirror phase 
(the reflection) he observes that identification may be made in respect 
of the specular brilliance of the photographic surface itself. (29) 
The mirror stage is central to Lacan's account of subjectivity 
because its apparent smoothness and totality is a myth. "The subject 
sees himself as constructed by the reflected, momentary, precarious 
image of mastery, imagines himself to be a man merely by virtue of the 
fact that he imagines himself." (30) 
Formation of the Human Subject - The Social Self 
Lacan then extends the mirror image to become the model of the 
ego function itself, the category which enables the subject to operate 
as 'I'. The mirror stage reveals the fictional nature of the centred, 
whole subject, showing the image of our first recognition to be a 
misrecognition, a falsity. Soon language replaces this image as the 
signifier assumes ascendancy over the subject, enabling it to be 
represented within the matrix of social communication. 
"It is in the Other that the subject is constituted as 
ideal that he has to regulate the completion of what 
comes as ego or ideal ego - to constitute himself in his 
imaginary ego. Where the subject sees himself, where 
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that real invented image of his own body that is given in 
the schema of the ego is forged, it is not from there 
that he looks at himself. It is in the space of the 
Other that he sees himself and the point from which he 
looks at himself is also in that space." (31) 
The 'I' with which we speak stands for our identity as subjects 
in language - the mirror image represents the moment when the subject is 
located in an order outside itself to which it will henceforth refer. 
The very imago which places the child divides its identity into two - 
cleaves it into self and objectified other. The subject is the subject 
of speech, constituted in language as division or splitting (32) and 
subject to that order. 
Kate Linker (33) adds that if the mirror stage in its 
cohesiveness provides a model for the ego function, if it locates the 
self within language, then it places it in a relation of dependancy to 
an external order, shifting according to placement, lacking fixed 
identity. ("It is this moment that decisively tips the whole of human 
knowledge into mediation through the desire of the Other" (34) ). This 
specular self is the social self - it is not an entity with an identity 
- for whatever identity it appears to have is derived only by 
identifying with others' perceptions of it. The self is always like 
another. 
Lacan states, 
"I am a man, means I am like he who I recognise to be a 
man, and so recognise myself as being such." 
('I' is an Other) (35) 
Subjects in language persist in their belief that somewhere 
there is a point of certainty, of knowledge and of truth. When the 
subject addresses its demand outside itself to another, this other 
becomes the fantasised place of just such a knowledge or certainty. 
This is the Other - the site of language to which the speaking subject 
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necessarily refers. The Other appears to hold the truth of the subject 
and the power to make good its loss, but this is the ultimate fantasy. 
Linker stresses Lacan's emphasis on the subject's circling around this 
fantasy of unity, emphasising its divided, uncohesive status and 
inherent instability. For this subject is always in process, produced 
in and through the modalities of language. Lacan returns repeatedly to 
the role played by specularity and to the look as guarantee of imaginary 
self coherence. 
Formation of the Human Subject - 'I am a Picture'  
Much of Lacan's theory is derived from a study of mimicry by 
Rodger Caillois. Rosalind Krauss's article, 'Corpus Delicti' gives the 
clearest account of this phenomenon. She writes that the life of any 
organism depends on the possibility of its maintaining its own 
distinctness, its self possession. Mimicry is the loss of this 
possession. The animal that merges with its setting becomes 
dis-possessed, de-realised, as though yielding to a temptation exercised 
on it by the vast outsideness of space itself - a temptation to fusion. 
The individual breaks the boundary of its skin and occupies the other 
side of its senses, it tries to look at itself from any point whatever 
of space. It is alike - not like something but simply, like. She calls 
this a projection - an operation through which the seeing subject is 
defined as a projection, a being-seen and correlates it to Caillois' 
subjectivity of vision. To quote Caillois - "It is with represented 
space that the drama becomes clear, for the living being is no longer 
the origin of the co-ordinates (the more conventional notion of the 
look), but is one point among others. It is dispossessed of its 
privilege and in the strongest sense of the term, no longer knows where 
to put itself." (36) She then observes that this relationship, in which 
the subject occurs as a being-seen from without is the one that Lacan 
constructs in his domain of the essentially visual. 
It is here that he diagrams the scopic drive to elaborate the 
dynamics of a specifically visual dimension within which the subject is 
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dispossessed. Previous discussions on looking, the look, have tended to 
emphasise the roles of narcissism and voyeurism so it is interesting to 
find a return to this first psychic investment in looking - scopophilia. 
Lacan observes that we are beings who are looked at in the spectacle of 
the world. 
The root of the scopic drive is to be found entirely in the 
subject, in the fact that the subject sees himself. What is involved in 
the drive is making oneself seen. The drive is given the task of 
seeking something that each time responds in the Other and at the level 
of the scopic drive it is the gaze. 
"The gaze is outside, I am looked at, that is to say, I 
am a picture." ( 3 7) 	(Lacan) 
The gaze is the object on which depends the fantasy from which 
the subject is suspended. From the moment that this gaze appears the 
subject tries to adapt itself to it ; furthermore, of all the objects in 
which the subject may recognise its dependence in the register of 
desire, the gaze is specified as unapprehendable and Lacan stresses that 
this is why it is, more than any other object, misunderstood. To quote 
Krauss, the visuality that Lacan is describing is "a mastery imposed 
from without, imposed on the subject who is trapped in a cat's cradle of 
representation, caught in a hall of mirrors, lost in a labyrinth." (38) 
What we have here is a subject which constantly forms itself in the 
image of others (or the 'Other'), who are in turn formed from images, 
ideas, expectations, representations and so on, ad infinitum. 
It is interesting to note the role played by narcissism in this 
process. Narcissism, denoting the attitude of a person who treats 
his/her own body in the same way in which the body of a sexual object is 
ordinarily treated has been expanded to include the concept of the ideal 
ego as being the target of self love. Freud writes that the development 
of the ego consists in a departure from primary narcissism and gives 
rise to a vigorous attempt to recover that state. This departure is 
brought about by means of the displacement of libido onto an ego ideal 
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imposed from without - satisfaction is obtained from fulfilling this 
ideal (39) . Similarly, Lacan reintroduces narcissism as an essential 
structure in the satisfaction that the subject gains from the specular 
image giving it a pretext for such a profound misconstruction. He says 
of the subject, that scarcely has its image been discerned than it falls 
in love with it. "This passion brings to every relation with this 
image, constantly represented by my fellow man, a signification which 
places me in such a dependence on this image that it links all the 
objects of my desire more closely to the desire of the other than to the 
desire they arouse in me. 040) 
Lacan also emphasises the aggression that, for him, is in all 
life that involves subjection to this structure. This point is worth 
noting if one views it in the light of recent discussions concerning the 
aggressiveness in photography, the wish to dominate and capture, 
involving spectators and practitioners alike. Lacan's subject brings a 
tinge of hostility into the world of objects. The pleasure derived from 
meeting himself in the mirror becomes, when confronting his fellow man, 
an outlet for his most intimate aggressivity. "From this point on the 
ego is a function of mastery, a play of presence, of bearing and 
) constituted rivalry. 041 	(There is in this a similarity to the 
'double' - although at first constituting a reassurance, a guarantee of 
life, it turns on the subject and becomes threatening, sinister.) 
Lacan's subject ends up by recognising that this being has never been 
anything more than its construct in the imaginary and that this 
construct disappoints all its certainties. "This ego is frustration in 
its essence - not frustration of a desire of the subject but frustration 
by an object in which its desire is alienated and which, the more it is 
elaborated, the more profound the alienation from its jouissance 
becomes.  42) 
Conclusion 
During the research for this paper I was struck by the 
similarities between, on one hand, the unconscious and Lacan's Other, 
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and on the other hand, photographs and the way we react to them, to the 
point of wondering if this was the particular power that photographs 
have. By way of explanation Freud has stated that the processes of the 
systems of the unconscious are timeless ; they are not ordered 
temporally - they have, in fact, no reference to time at all (Freud: On 
Metapsychology, Pelican Freud Library Vol.II; Penguin, 1984; p.191). 
Photographs too are timeless - it is this that gives them authority. 
The experience with which we view a photograph can, and has, been 
likened to the mechanisms of the unconscious (and of dreams), in the 
flaw of images and associations they release, mnemic traces, in Burgin's 
terms that series of 'psychic pans and dissolves' (Thinking Photography, 
Macmillan, London, 1982, p.212) which pre-figures the dream and the 
workings of the unconscious mind. Lacan views the unconscious as an 
area that must be apprehended in its experience of rupture, between 
perception and consciousness, in that non-temporal locus. As an idea of 
another locality, another space, another scene, the between perception 
and consciousness (Lacan : Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis, 
Penguin Books, 1979, p.56). This surely prefigures Sartre's description 
of the photograph, "that other world, timeless, that floats between the 
banks of perception." (43) In the Lacanian notion of the Other I also 
find similarities, for our relation to photographs is not entirely 
different from our relation to the Other and the desire it provokes. 
seek its gaze, seek confirmation of ourselves but receive nothing, 
emptiness, which conclusion reminds one of the horror and death Barthes 
speaks of as he contemplates and scrutinizes the photographic surface 
(it is also the source of its fascination and frustration). Annette 
Kuhn writes "The photograph is seen as Other - the other scene, the site 
of mystery and enigma, shadowy, the mise-en-scene of the unconscious, 
( 	 ) of Freud's uncanny, at once both familiar and threatening. 4 4 
In this area too, I had hoped to find answers. The world of the 
unfamiliar and uncanny, and in it the powerful image of the double, once 
again described the photographic image and certainly provided the basis 
for our fascination with it. Freud describes the uncanny as that class 
of the frightening which leads back to what is known of old and long 
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familiar. Its effect, often produced when the distinction between 
imagination and reality is effaced, is caused by something secretly 
familiar which has undergone repression. 
The double is connected with reflections, shadows, the belief in 
the soul and the fear of death. Originally an insurance against 
destruction to the ego and created from the primary narcissism which 
holds sway in the mind of the child and primitive man, the double takes 
on a different aspect when this stage has been lefts behind. From having 
been an assurance of immortality it becomes the harbinger of death, of 
menace. 
Surely it should have been the answer to my fascination with 
images but Freud's explanation of this fascination seemed somehow to 
deflate it. This wasn't Barthes' mad image - the one I was in search 
of. In Freud's argument, the preoccupation with all that was uncanny, 
including the double, could be understood as the reassertion within 
adult life, of more psychologically primitive states, namely those 
related to what he termed the omnipotence of thoughts and to a belief in 
animism - all those bonds which children and tribal man create between 
themselves and everything around them in order to gain mastery over an 
all too threatening and inchoate environment. 
"Our analysis of the uncanny has led us back to the old 
animistic conception of the universe, which was 
characterised by the idea that the world was peopled with 
spirits of humans and by the narcissistic overestimation 
of subjective mental processes as well as by all those 
other figments of the imagination with which man, in the 
unrestricted narcissism of that stage of development, 
strove to withstand the inexorable laws of reality. It 
seems as if each one of us has been through a phase of 
individual development corresponding to this animistic 
stage in primitive man, that none of us has passed 
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through it without preserving certain residues and traces 
of it and that everything that now strikes us as uncanny 
fulfils the conditions of touching those residues of 
animistic mental activity within us and bringing them to 
expression. 045) 
Rosalind Krauss, in her likening of the realisation of these 
earlier states of being to Barthes' stabbing "punctum", does extend this 
idea. She writes that the collapse of the distinction between 
imagination and reality, analysed by Freud as the primitive belief in 
magic, animism and narcissistic omnipotence, are all potential triggers 
of that metaphysical shudder which is the uncanny - for they represent 
the breakthrough into consciousness of earlier states of being and in 
this breakthrough the subject is stabbed, wounded by the experience. 
This trauma is a blow that penetrates the protective armour of 
consciousness, piercing its outer shield, wounding it by its effect of 
stabbing (Freud's "Beyond the Pleasure Principle"). She reminds us that 
Barthes connects the "punctum" to a kind of sudden fright that punctures 
the defences or to the shudder of fatefulness that is the uncanny. 
"That simple click is what Breton has called the 
'explosante-fixe' and that combination of madness and love, released by 
the essence of photography (that-has-been) which Barthes described as a 
'gone mad', is in its uncanniness, its convulsiveness, a kind of 'amour 
lou'." ( " ) 
Krauss relates the uncanny to that convulsive madness released 
on confrontation with the knowledge that photographs ordain death as 
they appear to give life. This is the wound that (for her) all 
photographs have the power to deliver, for each is also a double and a 
death. It is true that the person who has been photographed (not the 
total person who is an effect of time) is - so to speak - dead, but her 
conclusion was still an anti-climax, somehow not 'mad' enough. It was 
not my madness. 
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Foucault provided a useful perspective in his book Madness and 
Civilisation. What intrigued me was that in each point of his 
discussion I could equate his description of madness with the 
photograph. In his introduction he writes that we elect others to live 
out the chaos that we refuse to confront in ourselves. By this means we 
escape a certain anxiety, a certain moment of our own existence - that 
moment of disturbance, of penetrating vision into the depth of 
ourselves. In this I saw the compulsion to secure oneself in space and 
time, to certify existence, happiness and experience. His description 
of the madness of sixteenth century imagery is ascribed to the diversity 
of meanings attached to the forms and figures used. "Meaning is no 
longer read in an immediate perception, the figure no longer speaks for 
itself. Between the knowledge that animates it and the form into which 
it is transposed a gap widens, it is free for the dream - thus the image 
is burdened with supplementary meanings and forced to express them; 
dreams, madness and the unreasonable can slip into this excess of 
meaning - its power is no longer to teach but to fascinate." (47) (The 
likeness to photography is almost uncanny.) Similarly in the literature 
of the period, where the madness portrayed was that of man and his 
illusions and self attachment. "In this delusive attachment to himself 
man generates his madness like a mirage. The symbol of madness will 
henceforth be that mirror which, without reflecting anything real will 
secretly offer the man who observes himself in it the dream of his own 
presumption." (48) In the seventeenth century madness was expressed in 
the irony of illusion - and what better vehicle of illusion than the 
photograph itself, that which "plays on the surface of things, over all 
the workings of appearances, over the ambiguity of reality and illusion. 
It hides and manifests, it utters truth and falsehoods, it is light and 
shadow." (48) Madness here was at the heart of things and man, an ironic 
sign that misplaced the guideposts between the real and the chimerical, 
beginning where the relation of man to truth is disturbed and darkened. 
In its confinement, during the classical period, madness became for 
Foucault, the 'paradoxical manifestation of non-being (photographs as 
objects that are there but at the same time not), until finally, at the 
end of the eighteenth century, in what he constitutes as one of the 
greatest conversions of Western imagination, it became, upon its 
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release, the madness of desire. Language and desire caught in the 
limitless presumption of appetite and the insane dialogue of love and 
death - need I state the obvious? (Later still it was seen as that 
which alienated man from himself and nature - again that equation of 
photography/madness, the object and its referent). 
I finally found my madness in a statement by Lacan. A modest 
statement - but staggering in its implications. "The captation of the 
subject by the situation gives us our most general formula for 
madness.° 50) Here was the madness that I had felt, here too was my 
perception of the double and the uncanny. For the photographic image is 
the very double of our existence. (No wonder the shudder, the 
uncanniness). Here finally was what I interpreted as Barthes' madness. 
It is not so much the fact that the photographic essence is 
'that-has-been', but, (as he states earlier) in the light of our 
formation as subjects, the photograph ... "is an extended loaded 
evidence, as if it caricatured not the figure of what it represents but 
its very existence." (My emphasis.) (51) 
In this sense it is truly a mad image - 'a mad image chafed by 
reality' - our reality, for we are the mad image and in the photograph 
we see our own reflection. This is the wound that every photograph has 
the power to deliver. This is the fascination, the horror and madness 
that they possess - for in the photographic image we see ourselves as 
image - flat, no depth, image succeeded by image, animated by another's 
perception, and in its mad reality we see our own, for on the one hand 
we are indeed here ('my certainty is immediate - no one in the world can 
undeceive me') but on the other we are most definitely not. 
The image that I have in mind is a bizarre carnivalesque mirror, 
carnival being referred to here as that which sweeps away individuality, 
"where man is no more than a reflected image" (52) propelled into the 
whirlwind of his own fragmentation, split into the subject of the 
spectacle and object of the game. 
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Burgin talks of a new subject for the new society of information 
technology. A subject radically de-centred, formed in the wake of the 
signifier, the traces of its work, leisure and consumer activities, 
invisible and scattered across the fields of contemporary life in the 
Wrest. To this scattered and invisible field of the subject as data, 
society has added the scattered but visible field of the spectacle - 
sucked into the subject and into which it projects itself in a countless 
series of identifications. Burgin's society is one of the spectacle, in 
which the image has effectively replaced what it represents. A society 
where the referent is eaten alive by the signifier. To quote - "we are 
a society of the simulacrum - a copy of which there is no original." (53/ 
The myth of photography as truth was replaced with a new myth. 
The photograph as an ideological weapon that had been seen through, its 
game exposed. But what if it does speak the truth - the truth of a 
"real without origin or reality " (54) , the advent of the self as 'Other'? 
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SECTION III: DOCUMENTATION OF WORKS. 

I commenced this course with a number of aims and 
ideas: a strong desire to question reality (no doubt fueled 
by my own over active imagination); linked closely to this 
was the notion of a fragmented, conflicting identity and the 
concerns of vulnerability and alienation. Also significant 
was my fascination with the photographic image and my need 
to understand and relate this to my own practice. 
Over three years the format and emphasis of my work has 
understandably changed, evolving towards a more subtle 
interaction between these areas and a clearer appreciation 
of the photograph as a means to express them. 
I avoid any single reading of the works but rather emphasize 
their commitment to actively engage the viewer, to question 
- and the fluid, interchangeable nature of all the concerns 
that inform them. 
Firstly there is the notion of the medium itself. No matter 
how thoroughly recent theory has pulled the photograph 
apart, seen through its myths and exposed its lies it is 
inexorably linked to reality and, by implication, truth. To 
this end I have tried to conceal my use of collage as much 
as possible and then re-photographed the final, constructed, 
model. These images would not have the same power for me 
if, for example, they were painted or drawn. The fact that 
they are photographs, even though collaged and drawn into, 
creates a tension. (It is this bizarre, unresolved tension 
that holds my fascination.) It is important that the work 
has a direct anchoring in reality, so that it becomes, in 
effect, not a total fantasy created solely from imagination 
but involves a conflict between real and unreal, fiction and 
fact. 
They could be true, with a slight, sideways twist of the 
imagination. It is no accident that I use the photograph 
and its special qualities to present a different 'picture' 
and to question notions of reality and identity. The image 
I have in mind is one where 'real' and 'unreal' overlap and 
merge, of a world where fantasies are erected and labelled 
truth, where reality, as we know it, is based solely on 
construction and myth. Underlying this is a sense of 
alienation, the notion of identity itself as an interminable 
series of images, of barriers raised for protection and the 
fear and vulnerability that comes from the realisation of 
how firmly we are trapped within our own constructions. 
Perhaps after all the photograph does have a grain of truth, 
for mirrored in its struggle between fabrication and reality 
I see a reflection of our own parallel existence. 
The size of the works and, ideally, their installation play 
a crucial role in both implying this sense of 'mirror' and 
emphasizing the disorientation and breakdown between real 
and imagined. Although my ideas have been resolved within a 
series of large, collaged wall pieces, the installation as a 
device remains a significant consideration. 
BLACKMANS BAY PRIMARY SCHOOL: COMMISSIONED PROJECT - 1985/6.  
DESCRIPTION OF WORK.  
Three framed panels that fit together to form a total size 
of five feet (high) by nine feet (long). The piece was made 
by collaging photographs then re-photographing each panel in 
sections. All the prints are on silver bromide paper and 
dry mounted onto acid-free board. 
This work, commenced in late 1985, was commissioned under 
the Art in Public Buildings Scheme for Blackmans Bay Primary 
School. The guidelines given were that the work should 
relate to the school in some way. 
After spending a number of weeks observing and photographing 
I chose to work directly with the children rather than 
approach the piece from an historical or activity related 
level. My reasons for doing so were varied. The childreds 
acceptance of me and their eagerness to be photographed, my 
fascination with their moods, fantasies, games and role 
playing, their vitality ... to me they were the school. The 
piece is a visual attempt to describe my (and their) 
reactions to the experience. 
Another important factor in the style and conception of the 
piece was the space itself. The area designated, the 
entrance way to the main hall/gymnasium and canteen was 
cold, concrete and lifeless. It needed something large and 
visually alive. 
I soon realised that my accustomed approach would not be 
adequate. My previous works had incorporated the use of 
groups of images to set a mood or construct a narrative but 
the energy of the children precluded this. A sequence of 
single images seemed to suggest a succession of isolated, 
broken, moments but my impression was a more chaotic one. A 
collection of fragments and experiences that overlapped and 
merged, generating a sense of vitality and movement. I 
needed something more encompassing, more intense. The 
change from sequence or series of images to a large collage 
constructed from these fragments seemed a logical step. 
Formally, the resolution of the piece posed many problems. 
My work with sequential imagery certainly prepared the way 
but the number of images used, the task of constructing a 
space on a two-dimensional level, of balancing images to 
form a complex 'whole' instead of a linear narrative, 
demanded a new approach and was a valuable experience. 
While I do not consider it as part of the main body of my 
work, the construction of the piece - more specifically the 
use of collage and manipulation - was of crucial importance 
and has influenced all other work to date. Working as I do 
from feelings, emotions and fantasied images the realisation 
of the potential of collage, the prospect of creating my own 
believable. reality and the tension this raises with regard 
to the photographic image was (and still is) an exciting 
direction. 

"The Photograph then becomes a bizarre medium, 
a new form of hallucination: false on the level 
of perception, true on the level of time: a 
mad image, chafed by reality." 
Barthes, Roland. 
Camera Lucida: 
Fontana Paperbacks, 
8 Grafton Street, 
London. 1984. 
p. 115. 
'UNTITLED 1986/7'  
DESCRIPTION OF WORKS.  
Five large wall pieces. Each piece is ten feet (long) by 
six feet (high) and consists of six panels which fit 
together to make up the whole. They were made by assembling 
smaller collages which were drawn and painted into, then re-
photographed. All the prints are on silver bromide paper 
and dry mounted onto acid-free board. They are unframed. 
This group of five images was my first attempt to deal 
directly with my thoughts on the photographic medium and my 
concerns of myth, construction and alienation. The imagery 
was drawn from an experience of wandering the streets of the 
old city of Zurich at dusk/night: no traffic, sounds 
muffled by the snow, faces caught in the gleam of 
streetlights and passing into darkness, impersonal stares 
... no contact. 
I decided to pursue, and experiment with the use of collage 
for two reasons. Firstly because these images, although 
based on an experience, are imaginary; collage gives me a 
licence of imagination not possible in the single image. 
Secondly, the notion of the photographic image as a 
construct is an integral part of my own feelings on society 
and identity, and my main reason for using the medium is to 
portray this. 
The photographs for the backgrounds were taken at dusk to 
heighten the feeling of unreality - dusk is a special time 
for me, it is neither day or night but an in-between time 
that leaves space for the imagination. The images were 
blurred slightly to add to the feeling of dream - of merging 
and breakdown. 
All the figures were individually photographed in full 
sunlight, confusing the origin of the light source and to 
emphasize the mask-like quality of the faces. 
Painting into the collage was at first conceived only as a 
device for creating a receeding space and drawing the 
collaged pieces into a believable image. More 
experimenting, however, revealed the potential of the 
enlarged, re-photographed, marks themselves and was used as 
a further means of connoting chaos, fantasy and the 
breakdown between real and imagined. 
The positioning of the figures and the construction of the 
street scene were designed to intensify the impression of 
being able to walk into these images, and were important 
devices to create an illusion of a dissolving and merging of 
image space and real space. 
The final mock-ups were re-photographed to blend the 
collages, make them believable as a single image and to 
obtain the size that I needed. I had originally tried re-
photographing them in smaller, easier to manage sizes but 
realised the effect was too disjointed to maintain the 
illusion of a single image; hence my mastery of my fear of 
working with large prints and the eventual resolution of 
each image into six large panels. 





'UNTITLED 1987'  
DESCRIPTION OF WORKS.  
Three large pieces. Two of the works are nine feet (long) 
by forty inches (high) and consist of three panels which fit 
together to make up the whole. The third piece is twelve 
feet (long) by forty inches (high) and consists of four 
panels. They were made by putting together smaller collages 
which were drawn into and then re-photographed. All the 
prints are on silver bromide paper and dry mounted onto 
acid-free board. They are unframed. 
This piece evolved from a mental image of a room shut away 
from the world; an 	windowless place in which people 
acted out the endless motions of their lives unobserved and 
forgotten; a room thick with the stuff of dreams. 
I had intended to approach the construction of the works in 
a similar manner to my previous collages but after a number 
of unsuccessful attempts found it necessary to re-evaluate 
my ideas. The feeling of stagnation and dream seemed to 
call for simplicity - a more subtle merging of dream and 
real. 
The elaborate constructions of my first works were 
unnecessary here. Intense spotlighting was used to create 
the effect of infinite space. I found, too, that I was only 
interested in the top half of the room - hence the format of 
the works changed - in this manner I hoped to enhance the 
sensation of disorientation and floating, of being drawn 
into the image. 
One of my main concerns with the piece was the creation of 
an almost tangible sense of dream and illusion. My 
technique of blurring the images lacked the quality I looked 
for and painting into the piece, as I had done before, was 
too chaotic and direct. 
The problem was solved, finally, by placing tissue paper 
over the unexposed photographic paper, wetting it and 
spraying developer over the surface before making the 
exposure for the room images - creating a thickened, dream-
like atmosphere. 
These works were intended to be seen with my previous 
collages. The concerns of the blending of inner and outer 
worlds, of real and imagined space and the photographic 
medium are still important although I feel they concentrate 
more on private fears and a sense of the familiar as being 
claustrophobic and threatening - on barriers, loneliness and 
isolation. 



FIGURES 1987  
Description of Works  
Three pieces; each one is seven feet (high) by forty inches 
wide and consists of two panels which fit together. They 
were made by assembling photographs which were drawn into 
and re-photographed. All the prints are on silver bromide 
paper and dry mounted onto acid-free board. They are 
unframed. 
These works relate directly to the 'shattered figures' 
mentioned in my proposal. At that time I was experimenting 
with photographing the human figure in a fragmented, 
constructed way and composing portraits from smaller, 
multiple images to form broken, yet recognisable forms. 
Towards the end of 1985 I abandoned this procedure. My 
reasons for using multiple images had been to imply a sense 
of the composite ideals and emotions that shape a 
personality. I felt though, that the method used simply 
gave me a series of disjointed, contorted figures. It was 
too literal, with no connotation of the subtleties and 
tensions involved. Shortly afterwards I commenced 
photographing for the Blackmans Bay project which led to my 
experiments and use of collage and the completion of the two 
series of works - 'Untitled 1986/7' and 'Untitled 1987'. 
With the effects gained from my experiments for the 
'Untitled 1987' series I felt I could once again attempt to 
resolve the figures. My thoughts on them had altered 
slightly, influenced by the research for my seminar papers. 
Now the emphasis was not only directed towards a multi-
faceted personality but also to the idea of the human 
subject as image. The image I saw was more fluid: a figure 
suspended in a web of dreams and fantasies, drifting, 
reforming, pulled in different directions by the currents of 
desire, fear and conflicting emotions. 
Once again, the elaborate constructions of the 'Untitled 
1986/7' pieces appeared unnecessary. The figures suggested 
an implied sense of fantasy and tangled illusions rather 
than any background constructed from real space. This 
feeling was obtained using the same technique as with the 
'Untitled 1987' images, but, I extended the process to 
include the figures themselves and evoke the impression of 
change and disintegration. 
While I have resolved the three figures shown, I do not feel 
that they complete the piece and intend to continue 
experimenting and working on the idea. 



SECTION IV: WORK PROCESSES. 
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